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RECENT CASES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-GOVERNMENT
-RIGHT

OF COURT

TO ABROGATE

IMMUNITY-TORT

IMMUNITY WITHOUT

LIABILITY

LEGISLATIVE

CoNSENT.-Plaintiff, a paying patient in a county hospital brought
suit against the hospital district upon alleged negligence of the staff.
The defendant's demurrer was sustained by the trial court, based
on the long established rule of governmental immunity from tort
liability. On appeal the Supreme Court of California held, two
justices dissenting, that after a re-evaluation of governmental immunity from tort liability it must be discarded as mistaken and unjust. Muskopf v. Coming Hospital District, 359 P.2d 457 (Cal.
1961).
The principle is firmly established that a state or its subdivisions,
when a governmental function, cannot be sued without their consent.' This doctrine of sovereign immunity had its origin with the
personal prerogatives of the King of England,* and gained impetus
from sixteenth century political concepts.3 The rule was gradually
extended to county immunity,4 making its first appearance in the
United States in 1812'.
To relax the rigid doctrine of governmental immunity, certain
states have adopted a constitutional provision directing the legislature to provide in what manner suits may be brought against the
state.' However, such a provision is not self-executing,' and manifestly not so intended. A state by adopting such a provision has
recognized that sovereign immunity is a part of the substantive
1. Rogers v. Holmes, 214 Ore. 687, 332 P.2d 608, 611 (1958) "That a sovereign
state cannot be sued without its consent is a cardinal principle of law so well established
as to require no citation."
2. See 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 512-518 (2d ed.
19;2).
3. See 4 Holdsworth, The History of English Law 190-197 (1924).
4. See Russell v. Men of Devon, 100 Eng. Rep. 359, 362 (1788)
(unincorporated
county not liable for tort) ". . no fund out of which satisfaction is to be made . . . ft
is better that an individual should sustain an injury then that the public should suffer an
inconvenience."; See also Schaeffer v. Franklin County Veterans Hospital, 171 Ohio St.
228, 168 N.E.2d 547, 549 (1960) "A county is purely a political subdivision, an agency
or instrumentality of the state and is clothed with the same sovereign immunity from
suit."
5. Mower v. Inhabitant of Leicester, 9 Mass. 247 (1812)
(incorporated town, could
sue and be sued, but not liable in tort).
6. Examples of such constitutional provisions can be found in 20 states: e.g. Cal.
Const. art. 20 § 6 "Suits may be brought against the State in such a manner and in
such courts as shall be directed by law."; Fla. Const. art. III, § 22; N.D. Const. art. I § 22.
"Suits may be brought against the State in such manner, in such courts, and in such
cases, as the legislative assembly may, by law, direct."; Ohio Const. art. I, § 16; Pa.
Const. art. I, § 11; S.D. Const. art III, § 27; Wis. Const. art. 4, § 27.
7. Wolf v. Ohio State Univ. Hospital, 170 Ohio St. 49, 162 N.E.2d 475 (1959);
Raudabaugh v. State, 96 Ohio St. 513, 118 N.E. 102 (1917).
8. Schlesinger v. State, 195 Wis. 366, 218 N.W. 440, 441 (1928) "Otherwise, the
mandate would have been to the courts instead of the Legislature . . ."
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law; 9 thus, the power to abrogate such immunity rests exclusively
with the legislature,'0 and is clearly beyond the reach of the
courts. 1 If a legislature does attempt to waive immunity, it must
appear by express provision, 12 and be strictly construed.' 3 The
common "sue or be sued" statutory provisions adopted in many
states, including California,' 4 merely mean that the state or county
is to appear as a party to the action, but does not affect or enlarge
the liability.'3 It is essential to observe when considering immunity,
that it has a double aspect; i. e. immunity from suit, and immunity
from liability itself, the two being separate and distinct.'6
It is interesting to note the only other attempt to abolish governmental immunity in the absence of legislative action, has been an
Illinois school district decision.'1 It appears North Dakota would
not judicially discard immunity, but wait for action by the legislature.' In summary it may be said that blind following of antiquated
and outgrown precedent should not be countenanced, but it seems
the courts have recognized immunity only with reluctance because
bound by precedent and the constitutional division of powers.
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9. Schaeffer v. Franklin County Veterans Hospital, supra note 4.
10. Zeppi v. State, 174 Cal. App. 2d 484, 345 P.2d 33, 36 (1959) .
and where,
as here, the Legislature has clearly expressed its intention to maintain immunity, that
intention is controlling."; Bergner v. State, 144 Conn. 282, 130 A.2d 293, 296 (1957)
"Counsel have cited no case, nor has our research discovered any, which holds that a
state may be held liable for either negligence or nuisance in the absence of a statute
permitting suit and imposing liability."; Hinds v. City of Hannibal, 212 S.W.2d 401, 402
(Mo. 1948) "Any change in this situation most be made by the Legislature . . . because
only the Legislature could prescribe all regulations and limitations necessary to protect
the public interest and provide the fiscal basis for payment of such claims."; Taylor v.
State, 73 Nev. 151, 311 P.2d 733, 734 (1957); Scates v. Board of Comm'rs of Union
City, 196 Tenn. 274, 265 S.W.2d 563, 567 (1954).
11. Supra note 10.
12. Spielman v. State, 91 N.W.2d 627 (N.D. 1958).
13.
See Los Angeles County v. Riley, 20 Cal. 2d 652, 128 P.2d 537 (1942); Pigg v.
Brockman, 79 Idaho 233, 314 P.2d 609, 615 (1957) "A statute authorizing suit against
the state is in derogation of sovereignity and therefore must be strictly construed."
14. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 32121 provides: "Each local hospital district shall
have and exercise the following power: (b) To sue and be sued in all courts and places
and in all action and proceedings whatever."
15.
Talley v. Northern San Diego Hospital Dist., 41 Cal. 2d 33, 257 P.2d 22 (1953);
cf. Elizabeth River Tunnel Dist. v. Beecher, 117 S.E.2d 685, 689 (1961)
(A procedural
right only) "The fact that the . . , act provides that it may sue and be sued' cannot
be advanced as an assertion of State waiver of immunity or State consent to suit for torts."
16. Duree v. Maryland Casualty Co., 238 La. 166, 114 So. 2d 594, 596 (1959)
" . there exists a distinction between the traditional immuinty of the state from suit
and its long recognized immunity from liability vel non as respects actions based on torts
committed by agents engaged in the performance of governmental functions."; Manion
v. State, 303 Mich. 1, 5 N.W.2d 527 (1942); Jerauld County v. St. Paul-Mercury Indemnity Co., 76 S.D. 1, 71 N.W.2d 571 (1955).
17.
Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist., 18 Ill.2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89, 96
(1959). Two justices dissenting. "The doctrine of school district immunity was created by
this court alone. Having found that doctrine to be unsound and unjust under present
conditions, we consider that we have not only the power, but the duty, to abolish that
immunity. We closed our courtroom doors without legislative help, and we can likewise
open them."
18. Spielman v. State, 91 N.W.2d 627 (N.D. 1958).

